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Abstract  
Insecurity is a major problem amongst the nomadic communities in North western Kenya.  The 
communities include the Pokots, Turkana, Marakwet, Toposa and Karamoja.  Using the Pokot 
Community as a case study of nomadic life style, this paper examines the environmental 
constraints, cattle rustling and small arms as triggers of Pokot community movements into their 
frontiers; -zones of contact of states or communities.  In search of water and pasture, the Pokot 
traverse their frontiers and interact socially, economically and environmentally with their 
neighbours.  The movements expose their cattle and property to banditry and cattle rustling.  The 
Pokots thus acquire small arms to protect their livestock and property even though the 
acquisition of and stocking of arms is the responsibility of the government. So the acquirement 
of small arms by the Pokot creates a fragile insecurity situation characterised by cattle rustling 
and banditry.  As Kenyan citizens, the Pokots have a social contract with the state to provide 
security but this is not the case because of the transitional nature, as nomads.  Insecurity to the 
nomadic communities manifests in terms of environmental, natural resource based and identity 
based conflicts. It is concluded that addressing insecurity in this region has to lessen banditry, 
cattle rustling, social underdevelopment and negative ethnicity.  The steps towards solving state 
fragility and insecurity ought to take cognizance of the interactions between frontier citizens, 
environmental constraints, traditions, politics and acquisition of small arms. 
 
Introduction 
The itinerant Pokot Community, who own large numbers of cattle, live in north western Kenya. 
Their nomadic tendencies are normally triggered by, among other things, scarcity of pasture and 
water for their cattle. Their life is informed by harsh weather patterns characterized by 
temperatures of over 40 degrees centigrade and a rainfall of less than 500 mm (per annum).  To 
survive, the Pokot have built coping mechanisms that revolve around movement to and from 
water points and pastures. In their mind set, the Pokot consider the localities that they traverse as 
their frontiers.1 Consequently, the Pokot consider the grazing areas in North-western Kenya and 
Eastern Uganda as their frontiers.  However, as they lay claim to these frontiers, insecurity in 
terms of cattle rustling and conflicts over the scarce resources emerge.   
Cattle rustling and banditry activities involve organized armed raids which often result into 
human deaths and loss of livestock.  The Pokot consider cattle rustling as traditional and 
                                                            
1  See FN 3, below for the definition of frontiers. 
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customary and is therefore an important identity issue which informs the community 
reproduction process.2  Most profound though is the need for the Kenyan government to provide 
security for the community and their cattle as they traverse ‘their’ frontiers. This has not been 
forthcoming prompting the community to illegally acquire fire arms to secure themselves and 
their livestock.  The small arms, in the interpretation of the Pokot, are used for defence against 
external aggression.  The notion of external aggression here implies any attacks from the other 
communities around this region, such as the Marakwet, the Turkana or the Karamoja (from 
Uganda).  Using the Pokot as a representative case of the nomadic communities, this paper 
examines the environmental constraints that trigger the movements, cattle rustling and small 
arms proliferation and how these increase the chances for insecurity.  The paper concludes by 
suggesting a number of approaches that may be followed to alleviate the insecurity problems of 
the Pokot community. 
Frontiers and Frontier Citizenship 
Frontiers are zones of contact of a state or community.  Frontiers radiate from a given state or 
community so that the inner limits touch on the neighbouring states or communities, the outer 
limits of frontiers of any given state go far beyond the proximate and immediate neighbours.  
Frontiers are divided into two; the internal frontiers and external frontiers.  Internal frontiers are 
zones of contact within sovereign states while external frontiers go beyond state boundaries.  
Indigenous communities such as the Pokot and Turkana identify themselves with both internal 
and external frontiers without considering territorial borders.3 
 
In examining the frontiers of the states it is realised that the states in Africa are a design of the 
Westphalia state system, and this has had critical implications on their international relations.  
The new states had to establish state frontiers immediately upon independence in order to 
practise and project their influences.  The problem here is that state frontiers do not respect 
internal frontiers4.  Again, the interaction within internal frontiers and state frontiers is extremely 
complex due to the rules and laws observed by states.  In Africa, the inherited borders from the 
colonial (administration) legacy are inviolable.  The defunct Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) Charter Article 3 (2) stipulated that “member states solemnly affirm and declare their 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state for its inviolable right to 
independence.”5  The argument here is that borders acquired at independence are to remain uti 
                                                            
2  Cattle rustling, as a tradition enables young Pokots to acquire cattle, which they pay as bridal price.  For the 
young men who do not have enough cattle to pay as bride price, it is impossible to get married and therefore stands a 
possibility of being extinct.  Those who have excess cattle go further and become polygamous and therefore reproduce 
offspring more than the poor ones without cattle. 
3  See for example Taylor, P.J., Political Geography:  World Economy, Nation State and Locality  (New York: Longman, 
1985), p. 145. 
4  Ibid. 
5  The OAU Charter, Article 3(2), African Union (AU) maintains the same position in Article 4 (a), (b) 
and (g).  However the AU accepts intervention in article 4 (h). which states: the right of  the Union to 
intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. For details see the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
Article 4, done at Lome Togo, on 11th July 2000. 
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possidetis.  The acceptance of the borders is based on the fear that if issues of borders are 
allowed to change; many other cases would come up, hence causing conflicts.  To allow any 
changes of the borders of a state or states would lead to similar demands among other contested 
boundaries elsewhere.6  Most of the African states have accepted the inherited borders and 
advocate that they be retained.7  While matters that occur within the internal frontiers are 
considered internal affairs of states, territorial borders that delimit states are so porous to 
economic, social and cultural activities that they hardly restrict movements of persons. 
 
As the Pokot traverse their frontiers and interact socially, economically and environmentally, 
they cross the international border between Kenya and Uganda.  When the Pokot come back to 
Kenya, they carry arms across the borders, an illegal action that creates a fragile security 
situation in the region.  On many occasions, banditry activities have been associated with the 
cross frontier movements.  The Pokot, as frontier citizens, require security provided by both 
governments of Kenya and Uganda. This is not the case because the pokots as frontier citizens 
are transitional.  The security providers such as the Police are in static stations while the Pokots 
change their locations into their frontiers depending on where there is availability of water or 
pasture.  It is hard for the police to keep pace in order to provide adequate security.  The security 
situation in the Pokot area therefore shows disequilibrium between the expectation of the 
community and the reality about provision of security by the state.  As citizens, the Pokot have a 
social contract with the state that entails a number of issues.  While the Pokot community 
expects the government to provide security, Kenya government ought to exhibit legitimacy in 
shaping the expectations of this community and further shape the political environment to enable 
them practise their frontier citizenship.  Unfortunately, this is not the case in North-western 
Kenya. 
The acquisition of arms by the Pokot means a competing location of authority in North-western 
Kenya, a fragile environment for the security of Kenya, and questionable legitimacy and 
accountability of the state in the Pokot (community) areas.  Even if the Pokot were to address the 
incapacity of the government to provide security, there is lack of political processes through 
which the community can bargain with the state.  The situation in north western Kenya provides 
for the conditions of a fragile state which is when state structures lack political will and 
or/capacity to provide the basic functions needed for security, development, poverty reduction, 
and human rights.8   Kenya is not a failed state but may be classified as a divided state, one 
which manifests substantial divisions between national, ethnic and religious groups.  In these 
circumstances, Kenya has not been able to meet its population expectations or manage changes 
in the expectations through political processes. 
                                                            
6 Oduogo Cyprine Onyango’ ‘Territorial Claim as the Model Determinant of Inter-State Conflicts Between 
Ethiopia and Somalia, 1960-1991’ in P. Godfrey Okoth & Bethwell A. Ogot, (ed.), Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi: 
Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000), pp. 82-93:82. 
7 See for example Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (New Haven: Harvard University Press, 
1972). 
8 See for example OECD/DAC, The principles for good international engagement in fragile states and 
situations, Paris, 2007 and OECD/DAC, Concepts and Dilemmas of state building in fragile situations, Off-Print of the 




Frontiers of the Pokot Community and State Fragility 
The Pokot belong to the southern nilotes people.  Some Pokots live in the dry plains subsisting 
by livestock keeping while others live in the mountain region and depend on farming.9  They are 
both pastoralists and agriculturalist.  Though found at the border of Kenya and Uganda, most of 
them live in Uganda.  In Kenya, they occupy the West Pokot district, which borders Uganda to 
the west, Turkana district to the East, Baringo to the South-east, and Marakwet and Trans Nzoia 
districts to the south.   
The immediate internal frontiers of Pokot community in terms of districts are Samburu, Laikipia, 
Baringo, Uasin Gishu, Bungoma and Kipsigis districts. However, the community’s external 
frontiers extend beyond territorial borders of Kenya to Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia.  It is here 
that the cobweb nature of interactions of communities is evident.  If for instance Pokot raids their 
next door neighbours the Marakwet, they move into Uganda transforming Kenyan internal 
affairs into internationalised ones.  Consequently, reclaiming such cattle requires that the Kenyan 
security organs request permission from Ugandan government.  This phenomenon repeats itself 
whenever Pokots from Uganda raid their neighbours and cross over into Kenya.  What emerges 
is a series of conflict and cooperation in an environment that is extremely fragile. 
In a democratic state, just like all sovereign states, the government is supposed to provide law 
and order and when this is not the case, a security problem arises.  Based on a critical evaluation, 
one can locate the threats and vulnerabilities of frontier citizens.  The existential threats to a 
state, for example, normally involve matters of sovereignty, because it is sovereignty that defines 
a state as one.  Moreover, sovereignty is about providing security and maintaining order, certain 
level of legitimacy on all traits of governance and claim to ultimate right of self-government.10  
The ultimate right of self-government presents a situation in which the leadership and 
instruments of leadership must be evident in all parts of a state.   Where this is not the case then 
there is a major insecurity problem. 
In any independent state, a number of security concerns arise; first there must be evidence of 
legitimacy and assurance of protection in order to avoid state fragility and insecurity.  The 
protection against threats is the responsibility of a government, thus if this is not the case, then it 
becomes difficult to claim that the state is performing its responsibilities.  In north western 
Kenya, the state has in many occasions failed to protect its citizens from attacks by bandits and 
cattle rustlers. Political climate for a long time has been partisan, because communities that do 
not support the regime in power are denied the development required.  In enlisting support, the 
political parties of the day instil fear on those who dissent.  During national elections, for 
example, the government instigates fighting amongst the communities.  The evidence of 
                                                            
9 K. Kuvita, ‘Material Culture of the Pokot in Kenya: With Special Reference to Circulation of Articles’ In African 
Study Monograph Supplementary Issue No. 3, (1983). 
10 For a discussion on the normative framework of sovereignty see for example, Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel 
Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in 
Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 1-33.  
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government involvement cannot be underrated as Colin Kahl observes while explaining the 
attacks that earmarked the Moi regime: 
“The attacks were surprisingly similar, suggesting coordination by elites. In most 
instances hundreds of so called Kalenjin warriors attacked the farms of non-
Kalenjin, looted and burned houses, and killed and terrorised their inhabitants.  
The attackers typically dressed in an informal uniform of shorts and red or black 
T-shirts (Some marked their faces with clay) and they consistently armed with the 
traditional weapons, including bows, arrows, spears shields, pangas, and later 
homemade guns.  Available evidence also suggests that a number of prominent 
national and local KANU officials went so far as to directly support attackers by 
providing training, transportation, and some times payment.”11 
Government involvement in instigating violence during Moi’s leadership was rampant especially 
after he realised that he could not resist calls for political pluralism.  KANU politicians, mostly 
from the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, began to call for the forced eviction of other ethnic 
communities from their midst in the Rift Valley.12 
Triggers of Violence: Environmental Constraints and Security 
As the Pokot move across their frontiers, both imagined and physical, three types of conflicts 
which normally translate to violence are discernible.  These are the environmental conflicts, 
natural resource-based conflicts, and identity-based conflicts.  This section examines the 
implications of the environmental and natural resource based constraints in North-western 
Kenya. 
Environmental conflicts and overt violence are common in pastoral community areas.  The 
environmental conflicts emanate from extravagant tendencies in the utilisation of natural 
resources, which have negative consequences on the environment.  Thus environmental conflicts 
arise when different communities have incompatible goals about the utilisation of certain natural 
resources.13  For example, at Tot, an administrative division in Marakwet district, the Marakwet 
community build their homes on the mountain slopes to give opportunity for families to farm the 
lowlands.  The lowlands are not inhabited completely except for small manyattas14 for keeping 
goats and sheep.  During drought, the Pokot easily go into their neighbours’ farms and graze on 
the crops.  The Marakwet forcefully respond to this wanton aggression by repelling the Pokots or 
killing their livestock.15  Typically, violence starts by individual Pokot herders’ desire to utilise 
pastures in such a manner that would only benefit them.  As they use it individually, they 
collaborate with the rest of their community members.  Nevertheless, as the utilisation changes 
                                                            
11 Kahl, Colon H., States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in Developing World (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
2000), pp. 117-162:123. 
12 Ibid., p. 142. 
13 M. Mwagiru, Peace and Conflict management in Kenya (Nairobi: Pann Printers, 2003), pp. 55-62. 
14 Manyattas are makeshift homesteads of pastoral communities.  
15 Interview with Mr. Chebet on the issues of environmental conflicts between Pokots and Marakwets on 19 Sept 
2007 at Kapsowar, Marakwet District Headquarters. 
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from individual to community, there are possibilities of resource over-exploitation.  The fear and 
threat of possible resource exhaustion breeds fear and hence pressure on resources, leading to 
movements into the frontiers. 
As the communities exhaust pasture and water within their internal frontiers, they infringe in 
what other communities in Uganda and Ethiopia consider as theirs.  Indeed, matters of the 
environment also know no borders.  Naturally then, there appears to be a correlation between 
environmental conflicts domestically and internationally.  For instance, an insecurity issue that 
starts locally easily translates to the sub region and ultimately international levels. 
For the Pokot community, in a period of one year, there appears to be a cycle of environmental 
conflicts revolving around pasture.  During the rainy season, there is a lot of pasture and 
consequently peace. During periods of drought, there is heightened competition over use of 
pastureland.  As the Pokot realise that other communities such as the Turkana and Samburu also 
stand to utilise the same pasturelands, the potential for conflict becomes greater.  Intense 
competition over the utilization of the natural resources at this stage becomes a serious insecurity 
issue as the other communities’ utilization threatens the survival of the Pokot as a community.   
As the communities scavenge for pasture in their frontiers cattle raids intensify for two reasons.  
First, the frontier movements expose the cattle to raiders, and secondly, during the dry season, 
most of the cattle die creating the need for replenishment.  The situation stabilises during the 
next rainy season. This description tallies well with what Mwagiru calls, environmental conflict 
cycle, in which the analysis circle is divided into two parts.  The first part is the potential stage 
that includes latent and incipient environmental conflicts and secondly the manifest stage which 
includes acknowledgement and overt stages.16 
Drought-related violence also manifests at a number of levels to include that of grazing and 
water sources for animals; at the level of availability of food for human beings; and at the level 
of the destruction of the environment. The wastage of the environment causes natural resource-
based conflict.  However, because the environment knows no frontiers, the environmental 
conflicts affect the whole system. Conflicts between Pokot and other communities about the 
scarce natural resources in the last decade have been the worst humanitarian crisis in modern 
Kenya.  Without adequate water and pasture, frequent cattle raids are experienced in the region.17 
The raids become bloodier as desperate pastoralists try to sustain their herds.  Other communities 
in North-western Kenya such as the Marakwet depend on rivers to irrigate their farms. One of 
the major rivers borders Pokot territory and sharing this water resource has made it a major 
battleground between the two communities, one fighting to irrigate farms, the other to water 
livestock.  
Cattle rustling and Small Arms 
Cattle rustling is the stealing of domestic livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys and 
camels either stealthily or violently. Traditionally, young men who seek bride wealth would in 
certain circumstances steal livestock from their neighbours in the event that the groom’s family 
was too poor to advance the livestock to the young man seeking to start a family of his own.  For 
                                                            
16 See for example M. Mwagiru, Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya, op. cit. p. 55. 
17 The Editor, Disaster Relief Organization; DisasterRelief.Org. http://www.disasterrelief.org accessed on 6 September 2010.  
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centuries, cattle raids by Pokots and Marakwets have been a traditional method of replenishing 
herds in the wake of drought and disease.18  Traditionally, it is considered a legitimate activity 
whose execution is approved and consented to by community elders19.  Cattle raiding, the Pokot 
say, is an important way to show and to achieve prestige, and for stockless men (men without 
cattle), the only way to earn bride price and enter an independent pastoral existence.20  However, 
the proliferation of the modern and sophisticated automatic weapons has, quietly and negatively 
exacerbated the consequences of cattle rustling.21  Even though cattle rustling could be 
associated with tradition and therefore identity, the practice has evolved differently in the recent 
past.  Cattle rustling is today associated with killings and politics.22 In post-modern Kenya, cattle 
rustling has transformed from being a customary means of livestock restocking where traditional 
weapons such as bows and arrows and spears were used to a commercial practice where 
sophisticated weaponry is used.23 
 
The modern firearms have complicated the way cattle raids are contacted today.  While the 
philosophy of war among the Marakwets abstains from killing women and children, the Pokots 
in their attacks kill everything including innocent children and women, who otherwise would 
eventually give birth to future enemies.  Children, preferably girls, from the other side are 
captured as booty to decrease the ‘enemy’s’ population.24  In the past, cattle rustling was 
accepted by elders, but with the advent of small arms, it has become unnecessarily brutal and 
lethal. The following narration illustrates the brutality.  ‘One Sunday morning, the Pokots 
attacked Tot health centre during a polio vaccination.  In this attack about 12 children died not by 
bullet wounds only but most were crushed using stones.’ 
 
Insecurity in this area has had devastating effects on the lives of the inhabitants creating a very 
fragile situation.  In Tot division, schools (such as Kilang’ata primary) were closed in 2002 and 
have never been reopened.  Farming has nearly grounded to a halt.  This insecure environment 
has triggered rural-urban migration in which the Marakwet have settled in other peaceful areas 
especially in Eldoret, about 189 km away with negative consequences on the development of 
both Pokot and Marakwet districts.  The Marakwet District Officer I (DOI) Mr. Gicheru argues 
that there is need to encourage development oriented policies to enable the Marakwet and Pokot 
                                                            
18 USAID, Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project: Assessment and Programmatic Recommendations: Addressing 
Pastoralist Conflict in the Karamoja Cluster of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, (Washington D.C: Management Systems International, 
2002). 
19  Interview with Mzee Joshua Lang’at, 77 years old and a member of a two year old Marakwet Council of Elders, 
20 Sept 2007. 
20 Cattle rustling is an identity issue, the Pokot community here are extremely involved in cattle rustling to an 
extent that even if they are educated, they still participate in cattle raids.  
21 M. Boking, Outline of Pre-colonial Eastern Pokot History, (Institute of African Studies: University of Nairobi, 1998). 
22 Interview with father Walters Kibet, a catholic priest at Kapsowar Parish at Kapsowar, 20 Sept 2007. 
23   The Standard, Nairobi, Kenya Friday, September 3, 2010, p.13. 
24 Interview with Father Walters Kibet, op cit.  
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to do sedentary farming rather than pastoralism to reduce or bring to a stop incidences of cattle 
raids.25 
The insecurity in southern Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Eastern Uganda, has led to an influx of 
firearms into North-western Kenya, raising the possibility of more conflicts.  In a society that a 
generation ago relied on spears to beat back rivals who attacked with poisoned arrows, the 
assault rifle has become the weapon of choice in terms of banditry activities. Both Presidents 
Kenyatta and Moi regimes armed the Pokots to act as a buffer from external raiders emanating 
from neighbouring countries. However, the community has turned the same guns against their 
immediate neighbours.  Others get these arms from illegal gun markets in Kenya which find their 
way from as far as US and China through war zones in neighbouring countries.26   
Insecurity escalated when the government gave arms to Pokot police reserves and home guards.  
The arms were often used not for intended purposes but for cattle rustling.  For instance, the 
Elmo of the Marakwet community suffered in the hands of Pokots not because they did not know 
how to fight but because they used arrows against modern weaponry. There was evidence of the 
Pokot training in small arms tactics, a training undertaken by their kinsmen actively serving in 
the regular military and paramilitary forces, Kenya Army, General Service Unit (GSU) and the 
Kenya Police.27  Besides encouraging and promoting cattle rustling, small arms also increased 
the amount of raids and crime in Pokot and Marakwet border areas.  Incidences of carjacking and 
home break-ins became extremely common.28  The various attacks led Marakwets to start 
acquiring arms especially from captured or killed Pokots.  To supplement the number of arms, 
the Marakwets also bought arms illegally.   
Describing the superior Pokot tactics, Father Walters narrates how one day his father, a Mr. 
Kibet, a member of Marakwet County Council, was nearly killed when the Pokots attacked him.  
First they tactically surrounded the nearby GSU camp using a few sentries to pin down the GSU 
while the rest of the raiders attacked the villagers.  This was superior tactics beyond normal 
cattle rustling.29  A research on small arms and insecurity in the north rift by Security Research 
and Information Centre (SRIC) revealed that the pastoralist communities in this region had over 
127,519 illegal arms.  There were 66,239 arms in Turkana, 36,937 in West Pokot, 16,478 in 
Samburu, 7,773 in East Baringo and only 92 in Marakwet.  The report also revealed that some of 
these arms were more sophisticated than those held by the state security officers.30  This has led 
                                                            
25 Interview with Mr. Gicheru, DOI, Marakwet district, 24 Sept 2007 at Marakwet district headquarters, 
Kapsowar. 
26 See for example Human Rights Watch, 2002 and Mwachofi Singo, Francis Wairagu and JAN Kamenju, Peace, 
Security and Development: An Agenda for the North Rift Region of Kenya (Nairobi: SRIC, 2001). 
27 Interview with a Mr. Toyok at Kapenguria, 29 Sept 2007. 
28 Interview with Mzee Joshua Lang’at, 77 years old and a member of a two year old Marakwet Council of Elders, 
20 Sept 2007. 
29 Interview with Mr. Walters Kibet, a Catholic priest at Kapsowar Catholic Parish, op. cit. Born and brought up 
at Chesogoch, a junction Shopping Centre just a few kilometers from Tot. 
30 J. A. N. Kamenju, M. Singo and F. Wairagu, Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small arms and Insecurity in the North Rift of 
Kenya (Nairobi: Security Research and Information Center–SRIC 2003). 
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to an increase in cases of banditry and cattle rustling.  Crimes such as car jacking, personal crime 
and poaching have increased since the government security agencies are overwhelmed.31  
The Facilitating Insecurity Environment 
Banditry  
Besides the harsh environment that characterizes North-western Kenya, there are also waves of 
activities that border on crime. The issues of banditry, underdevelopment and ethnicity 
compound the lawlessness that inhibits provision of security.  The basic insecurity problems in 
North-western Kenya are best conceptualised in the context of the relationship between borders, 
frontiers and violence.  While some attention has been focused on territorial borders, little has 
been given to the problem of internal boundaries.  The internal borders separate different 
nomadic communities that know and respect no territorial borders.32  The problem of insecurity 
then becomes inter linked throughout the conflict system. The diffusion of insecurity has 
generated a wave of internally displaced persons who have become a serious security problem in 
the conflict system by providing a ready source of small arms carried across the borders into 
Kenya. 
Banditry and cattle rustling are major security issues among pastoral communities in Kenya.  
Banditry affects and crosses the border of all the states in eastern Africa.  The responses of the 
governments have been to send in the military and police officers, who seem to be overwhelmed 
by fire power of the bandits.33  The Marakwet and Pokot communities have, for a long time, 
engaged in banditry and cattle rustling with little government interventions.34  Because the areas 
are frequented by bandits, there are fewer development activities compared to other parts of 
Kenya.35  Marakwet district for instance, has a large population, but there is no tarmac road to 
serve this population indicating biased political policies and apparent economic marginalization 
of pastoralists from mainstream national development. 
Social underdevelopment 
Because of insecurity, schools and hospitals are unsafe and insecure for the public.  Primary 
schools such as Ngenyireel and Murkutwo had to be relocated to new sites picked as defensive 
positions.36  The changes of school locations have serious negative impacts on school attendance.  
                                                            
31 C. Jefferson and A. Muchai, Kenya Crime Survey 2000 (Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre – 
SRIC 2003). 
32  M. Mwagiru, “Borders, Frontiers and Conflict In the Horn of Africa:  Some Preliminary Hypothesis”, 
Prepared for “The Horn of Africa Between Post-War Reconstruction and Fragmentation” an Expert Workshop By The 
Development and Peace Foundation, op. cit. 
33 Ibid, and The East African Standard, (Nairobi) April, 4 (2001).  Currently, there has been improvement in 
government involvement in development.  An exercise Dumisha Amani, a military exercise combined with development 
agenda is currently going on in the north rift.  It intends to open up the North Western Kenya through development.   
34 USAID, Greater Horn of Africa, Peace, Building Project Assessment and Programmatic Recommendations op cit. 
35 L. Barasa and F.Oluoch, Marakwet District, Kenya Human Rights up Date Issue 8-op cit. Even though there are 
many other factors that contribute to underdevelopment, insecurity is a major contributing factor. 
36 Interview with Mwalimu Mercy Jerop, a volunteer teacher, narrates how the community has adopted the new 
way of life after several attacks, 27 Sept 2007. 
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The number of children in schools is generally low. Although feeding programmes have been 
launched to keep the children in schools, the distances to schools is a problem.37 Apart from the 
isolated schools, there is only one health facility in the entire area, Tot health centre.   
The border between Pokot and Marakwet has a number of roads.  Most of these roads are, 
however, impassable creating a challenge for motorists and security agencies.   During cattle 
raids when alarm is raised, the government security agents, especially the police, the army and 
GSU are slowed down by the poor roads leading to serious loss of life and property.  Besides the 
poor state of roads, telephone communication is only by mobile providers; Safaricom or Zain, 
facilities that were only installed recently in the year 2007.  The facilities come at a price though 
as the costs of owning, maintaining and making telephone calls are too high for the inhabitants.  
The poor infrastructure implies weak security systems and low economic activities.  It also raises 
transportation costs which increase the prices of commodities excessively and make it hard for 
shopkeepers to stock a variety of commodities.  For example, in Tot and other market centres in 
Marakwet and Pokot, a 300ml bottle of soda costs about ten to fifteen shillings more than the 
official company retail price.  
 
Credit facilities that could assist in economic development are equally lacking in this region. For 
the few such as the Kenya Commercial Bank micro-finance facility, difficult terms and 
conditions have made it impossible for the people in this region to access credit.  For the 
Marakwet who grow sorghum, finger millet, cassava, mangoes and bananas, market for their 
produce is a major constraint to their efforts in economic development.  Mangoes, for example, 
are perishable and can only be consumed within a short period as there is no processing factory 
in this location.  The closest and probably the place where mangoes are sold in bulk is in Nakuru 
and Nairobi, a distance of approximately 300km and 470km respectively. 38 
Negative Ethnicity 
Negative ethnicity makes the Pokot and the neighbouring communities to live in constant 
mistrust.  The Marakwet are always suspicious that at a certain point, the Pokot may attack and 
destroy their crops and property.   Even though this is the case, there are a number of efforts 
being made to ensure that the two communities are integrated properly. Most of the efforts are 
aimed at building confidence between the communities.  In one village, Murkutwo, a boarding 
secondary school has been built to admit students from both the Pokot and Marakwet 
communities to allow them integrate and understand each other fully.39 
Negative ethnicity is highly rooted in this part of the country, yet the government security 
agencies – GSU, Kenya Police or Kenya Armed Forces,-have not been effectively employed to 
restore peace.  This is possibly because the political leadership has in the past been using the 
divisive ethnic strategy to hold on to power. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission Report 
                                                            
37 Interview with Tot area Chief Mr. Maina who narrates that the school feeding programme encourages children 
to go to school, albeit with difficulty. 
38 The communities cannot afford to transport their farm products at all and that is why Mr. Joshua Yatich of 
Sambalat village dreams of a time when there will be a mango juice making factory, interview, 1 Oct 2007. 




recorded the massacre against the Marakwet in North-western Kenya, as an attempt by the then 
ruling party, KANU, to gain back political ground that it had lost since 1992.40  The infamous 
March 12, 2001 massacre of the Marakwets by a large group of Pokots armed with sophisticated 
fire arms, in which more than fifty people were killed, was part of the ruling party elites’ 
political scheme to cling to power and sustain its hold in the Rift Valley Province ahead of the 
2002 general elections.41 
 
Conclusions 
The interaction between the environmental constraints, traditions, politics and the acquisition of 
fire arms creates an extremely volatile situation in North-western Kenya.  The incumbent cattle 
rustling and banditry coupled with hostile climatic conditions and economic marginalization 
makes it extremely difficult to enforce security.  North-western Kenya is remote and far removed 
from the central government leadership.  In order to provide security to the frontier citizens, the 
government could provide these communities with transitional security, one that accompanies 
the communities as they traverse their frontiers.  This could be enforced by educating and 
sensitizing the communities on the benefits peace. 
In order to access the communities and deal with the bandits conclusively, the infrastructure 
needs to be improved.  The presence of small arms and their trafficking have changed the nature 
and practice of cattle rustling.  However, for the north-western Kenya, communities require the 
weapons to protect their animals against wild animals and the vagaries of the semi desert.  The 
communities should be sensitized about the proper use of the weapons though.  Other economic 
activities need to be initiated to empower the inhabitants of this region who rely fully on their 
cattle for survival. One may be tempted to argue that, provision of water could alleviate the 
suffering of the Pokot.  But this is not the case because, while the Kenyan Government has been 
sinking boreholes and building water dams with intent to provide water, the banditry and cattle 
rustling still persists.  Improving the general economic well being of the region must be a top 
priority to be addressed on an equal footing with the problem of pasture and water. 
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